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Nuclear Debates in France
David S. Yost
France has made significant adjustments in its defence policies since 1990-
91 in view of the end of the Cold War. Decisions about some of the most
important questions - in particular, regarding nuclear weapons - have,
however, been postponed until after the presidential elections that are sched-
uled for May 1995. President François Mitterrand has made his recommen-
dations clear, but it is uncertain - and, in some areas, doubtful - whether his
successor will adopt them.
Questions that might seem at first glance to be technical or second-order
issues - for instance, which delivery means should be procured and when,
and whether further tests are required to develop adequate simulation capa-
bilities - are in fact inseparable from fundamental and, at times, heated
debates. The arguments concern the strategic and political purposes of
France's nuclear arsenal, arms-control prospects and constraints, and the
scope for cooperation and consensus on nuclear-weapons matters in Western
Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. In some ways, it might be argued, the
ultimate issue in the debates is the extent to which France can still pursue an
autonomous course in its national strategic policy, in its alliances, and in
negotiations about arms control.
This article discusses current policy and the main arguments over nuclear
force posture, doctrine, arms control (including testing and proliferation)
and cooperation with allies. In each of these areas, clear disagreements stand
out. Some of the central differences in judgement concern the extent to which
France should prepare for military operations that may include nuclear
weapons. It would be incorrect to characterise the central differences as a
division between 'war fighting' and 'deterrence' approaches to nuclear
weapons. This old (and generally unilluminating) dichotomy does not apply
because all the main participants in the current discussions in France favour
deterrence and effective war-prevention. One of the core questions is what
types of capabilities are most likely to convince an adversary of the genuine
seriousness of France's resolve, and thus offer the best prospects for deter-
ring aggression or coercion. Perhaps the least misleading way to describe the
central differences over nuclear policy would be to call them disagreements
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over what measures are required for deterrence, with one approach oriented
towards 'more operational' military capabilities and the other towards a
'less operational' force posture.1
Broadly speaking, the 'more operational' approach - mainly associated
with the Gaullists - emphasises the defence of French and allied interests
through robust and flexible military capabilities - both offensive and defen-
sive. This includes developing nuclear forces capable of being used, if
necessary, with control and discrimination, particularly in confrontations
with countries of the 'South' that may be armed with nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons. To develop such forces, the 'more operational' ap-
proach holds, France must reject unreasonable constraints on nuclear test-
ing. By this logic, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would be
unacceptable, especially in the near term when France has not yet developed
adequate simulation capabilities, because a test ban would excessively
hinder the maintenance and improvement of France's capabilities and would
probably not prevent or even discourage proliferation. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) and other institutions and agreements devoted to non-proliferation are
deemed worthy of support; but, it is argued, they are unlikely to be so
successful as to allow France and its allies to forego active defences and
means of selective intervention - nuclear and conventional.
In contrast, supporters of the 'less operational' approach - notably in the
Socialist Party - have more confidence in traditional French nuclear deter-
rence policies (including principled opposition to strategic ballistic-missile
defences and limited nuclear options) and in existing non-proliferation re-
gimes. They place more emphasis on diplomatic efforts to achieve non-
proliferation goals and to promote stable and predictable relations among the
great powers, in view of the fluidity and potential volatility of the post-
Soviet world. From this perspective, a CTBT and other measures, such as
greater international supervision of transfers of fissile materials, could be
useful if they contributed to the perpetuation and expanded authority of such
entities as the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the Conference on
Disarmament, the IAEA and the UN Special Commission in Iraq, with
enhanced means of surveillance and enlarged powers of intervention. Such
an approach might, it is argued, provide a framework that would legitimise
the deterrent postures of France and the other recognised nuclear powers and
discourage other states from seeking nuclear weapons.
Representatives of the 'more operational' approach include Jacques
Chirac, the leader of the Gaullist Rassemblement pour la République (RPR),
and other RPR politicians, such as Pierre Lellouche and Jacques Baumel.
President François Mitterrand is the most prominent champion of a 'less
operational' approach, and other examples include Socialist politicians, such
as Jean-Michel Boucheron, and analysts, such as Pascal Boniface and
Marisol Touraine, who served in high-level advisory positions in recent
Socialist governments. Sources tend to attribute the 'more operational'
approach to politicians and analysts in the Gaullist RPR and part of the
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Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF), some leaders of the military
and defence-industrial establishments, and some officials in the Ministry of
Defence, the Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale and the Commis-
sariat à l'Énergie Atomique. A 'less operational' approach is ascribed to
Socialist politicians and analysts and part of the UDF, and to some officials
in the Foreign Ministry and the Elysée Palace.
Such generalisations should be treated with caution, however, and the
views of individuals often defy categorisations based on bureaucratic roles
or party affiliations. For example, Admiral Jacques Lanxade, the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces, has expressed reservations about strategic ballis-
tic-missile defences and proposals for more 'usable' nuclear weapons that
are similar to those put forward by Pascal Boniface (indeed, Lanxade even
cites Boniface on the latter point); but Lanxade's published views seem more
favourable to a resumption of nuclear testing than those of Boniface.2
Similarly, it is evident that some in the Gaullist RPR have reservations
about a 'more operational' approach that might imply a greater readiness to
use nuclear weapons in combat and that would thus deviate from the tradi-
tional principles, such as 'non-war' (non-guerre), on which the national
consensus in support of nuclear deterrence has been based. Moreover, indi-
viduals who generally favour a 'more operational' approach differ about
how much relative importance to attach to military responses, such as active
defences, and to diplomatic efforts, such as the NPT and other arms-control
measures, to curb proliferation. Conversely, some opponents of more 'us-
able' nuclear weapons support the development of air and missile defences
so long as a 'North versus South' presentation is avoided and improvements
in Russian strategic defences are not legitimised or encouraged.
Some French observers have argued that, beyond the relatively centrist
'more operational' and 'less operational' approaches to deterrence, two
minority schools of thought imply the 'death of deterrence' - la mort de la
dissuasion. One such school favours a CTBT as a key step towards nuclear
and then general and complete disarmament (an attitude discerned in some
Socialists, among others). Another school supports the development of more
'usable' nuclear weapons not merely to enhance the credibility of deterrent
threats, but in order to be ready to engage in nuclear operations, on the
grounds that the taboo against nuclear weapons use will probably be broken
eventually and may not be promptly restored (a view attributed to some
Gaullists and some members of the defence-industrial and military-technical
establishment). The former school is dismissed by the mainstream 'more
operational' and 'less operational' tendencies as naive and irrelevant, while
the latter has been widely castigated for confusing deterrence preparations
with operational employment intentions.
Some politicians, officials and analysts have been accused by others of
concealing an interest in actually conducting nuclear strikes. Some of those
so accused have hotly resented and vigorously rejected such characterisa-
tions of their positions. In their view, diversifying France's nuclear arsenal
forms part of the necessary response to the evolving and foreseeable threat
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environment; and it is analytically misleading and politically demagogic to
equate an interest in acquiring weapons of lower yields and greater accuracy,
which might offer options for more discrimination and flexibility and thus
bolster deterrence, with an endorsement of a doctrine calling for actual
operational employment. Unfortunately, some statements have lent them-
selves to misunderstanding or deliberate distortion, since it has been hard to
tell whether some proposals for new capabilities and/or doctrinal revisions
have been meant to guide action policy or solely to influence the decision-
making of possible foreign adversaries.3
The debates underway have therefore been rather disjointed. French poli-
ticians and commentators have taken individual positions and made subtle
distinctions as they have seen fit, influenced at times by internal political
struggles, with no interest in conforming to rigid intellectual schémas. De-
spite the risk of over-simplifying or caricaturing complex differences in
outlook, there may be some heuristic value in distinguishing between 'more
operational' and 'less operational' approaches.
Force Posture
In decisions comparable to those in the United Kingdom and the United
States, France has reduced nuclear-weapons-related spending and cut back
forces and alert levels since 1990-91. Previously envisaged nuclear force
improvements have also been delayed and cut back, partly in order to help
finance the post-Gulf War priorities of improved strategic mobility and
command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) for crisis inter-
vention purposes. The remaining force consists of 18 S-3 intermediate-range
ballistic missiles (IRBMs) on the plateau d'Albion; five nuclear-fuelled
ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) that will be replaced by four new-
generation boats, the first (Le Triomphant) to be operational in 1995 or
1996, with the new M-45 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM); air-
sol moyenne portée (ASMP) air-to-surface missiles that are nuclear-armed
and can be launched from several types of aircraft, when these aircraft have
been appropriately configured and nuclear-certified {Mirage 2000Ds, Mi-
rage IVPs, Mirage 2000Ns, Super-Étendards and, prospectively, Rafales);
and 30 Hades short-range missiles in storage for possible reconstitution.
According to the programme law for 1995-2000, approved in June 1994,
'the world situation does not justify the immediate improvement of the
technical performance' capabilities of the French nuclear forces. 'The spe-
cific characteristics of future [nuclear] weapons, destined to replace the
current generation, will be defined after studies on [test] simulations, and in
1997 at the latest, when the law is reviewed'. In the meantime, the pro-
gramme for four new-generation SSBNs with M-45 SLBMs is to be contin-
ued; preparations are to be made for the possible replacement in 2005 of the
S-3 IRBMs, with M-4 SLBMs placed in the S-3 silos; work is to continue on
the M-5 SLBM, now scheduled for possible deployment in 2010; and studies
are to continue for a successor to the ASMP stand-off missile, 'taking into
account the evolution of threats and missile defences'.4
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President Mitterrand has attached considerable importance to the timely
development of the M-5 SLBM, partly so that it might eventually be de-
ployed in silos on the plateau d'Albion as a replacement for the S-3s; in early
1994, however, he agreed that in the interim the M-4 or M-45 could replace
the S-3s. Mitterrand has seen no urgent need for research and development
for a more accurate and longer-range air-launched missile. In contrast,
Defence Minister François Léotard and part of the military-technical estab-
lishment have argued for delaying the M-5 SLBM's development and have
expressed doubt about the wisdom of deploying it in a ground-based mode.
In their view, this deployment concept should be abandoned and the M-5's
development should be stretched out to help to finance the development of a
longer-range stand-off missile for precision attacks, which could be either a
subsonic stealthy cruise missile, derived from Matra's Apache family, or a
supersonic air-to-ground ballistic missile, derived from Aerospatiale's
ASMP and sometimes called the air-sol longue portée (ASLP). Only a
conventional-warhead arme de précision tirée à grande distance is planned
for procurement in the 1995-2000 defence programme, and the government
might choose to pursue both of these types of missiles. Either could serve as
a nuclear delivery system, but a highly-accurate, subsonic, low-altitude,
high-payload stealthy missile could have certain operational and cost advan-
tages, particularly for conventional operations involving a large number of
strikes.5
Of all Mitterrand's policy choices, his support for deploying SLBMs,
such as the M-4, M-45 or M-5, in silos on the plateau d'Albion is perhaps
the least likely to withstand future pressures. Mitterrand's support for this
course appears to be based on satisfaction with the reliability of continuous
communications with the IRBM force (in contrast with the SSBNs) and an
apparent calculation that it would inhibit funding for a new air-launched
missile that could be used as a nuclear delivery system (and that would be
more accurate, flexible and 'usable' than the IRBMs). Mitterrand has argued
that silo-based missiles strengthen deterrence because an enemy's attack
against them would furnish proof of aggressive intentions and provoke
prompt retaliation by the SSBNs, and he has implicitly rejected the counter-
argument that the IRBMs, as fixed lucrative targets, are destabilising.
Xavier de Villepin (the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Defence and the Armed Forces) recently observed correctly, how-
ever, that 'the great majority of experts judge the abandonment of one
component [of France's triad of SSBNs, IRBMs and aircraft] as predictable,
even financially inevitable'. For these experts, the hypothesis of deploying
SLBM missiles in silos seems 'doctrinally unconvincing, militarily vulner-
able, technically delicate, and financially costly'.6
The debate about the relative urgency of developing more accurate air-
launched missiles forms part of the discussion about possible new nuclear
warheads. In August 1993, General Vincent Lanata, then the Chief of Staff
of the Air Force, called for variable-yield warheads for a new missile of
'great accuracy'. In his view, an air-launched missile would offer several
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advantages over IRBMs - above all, a non-ballistic mode of penetrating
enemy defences, and much sharper accuracy and flexibility. The latter judge-
ment is widely shared in the military-technical establishment and the RPR-
UDF majority.7
Whether France should develop nuclear weapons with lower yields, vari-
able yields and confined effects is, however, the most contentious issue on
force posture. Some define the issue as how to carry out 'surgical' or
'decapitating' strikes against 'dangerous installations, or even simply the
bunker of a dictator, while causing a minimum of suffering to civilian
populations'.8 Some of the French have advocated building low-yield nuclear
weapons - including earth-penetrators able to reach hardened and buried
command bunkers - that could be delivered with greater accuracy, flexibility
and discrimination than France's current weapons to reinforce deterrence
with a credible, yet non-verbal, message about France's capabilities. (Some
proponents of such capabilities contend that explicitly articulating a doctrine
for the possible employment of such 'usable' weapons is unnecessary and
could be counter-productive.)
It is argued that relatively high-yield and inaccurate weapons were ad-
equate for the 'anti-cities' nuclear posture that France developed to deter
Soviet aggression, but that such forces and threats cannot be credible for
contemporary deterrence requirements (or acceptable to French and interna-
tional opinion) unless the threat to France is potentially mortal. The counter-
argument from adherents of the 'less operational' school of nuclear deter-
rence is simple: if France could conduct high-accuracy attacks, why not
prepare to do so with conventional weapons and reserve nuclear weapons as
the truly ultimate recourse for protecting the nation's vital interests? The
'more operational' response is that threatening - and/or carrying out - such
conventional attacks might not be sufficient to deter the use of weapons of
mass destruction, and that France cannot, at any rate, afford to acquire
conventional systems in great quantities. Force-posture arguments influence
doctrinal choices, and vice versa.
Doctrine
Doctrine on deterrence and force employment has been made less explicit
about specific threats and operational scenarios. Rather than referring di-
rectly to Moscow as the threat justifying the nuclear deterrent or dwelling on
euphemistic abstract theories, such as la dissuasion du faible au fort (deter-
rence by the weak of the strong), the French have returned to Gaullist
formulas of the 1960s - asserting that France has no 'designated enemy' and
that its deterrent has a tous azimuts (all the points of the compass) orienta-
tion. It has nonetheless been apparent from official statements that the
former Soviet arsenal continues to serve as a primary justification for
France's nuclear deterrent. As Prime Minister Pierre Bérégovoy said in
1992, 'as long as there continues to exist, despite the progress in East-West
negotiations, an [ex-Soviet] arsenal henceforth divided between a greater
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number of powers, France must assure the credibility of this ultimate guar-
antee'.9
Although there is no plausible Russian threat in the 'foreseeable present'
(as some French strategists put it), Russia's massive military potential and
uncertain future justify French precautions. Various events - for instance, a
return to dictatorship in Moscow, a civil war in Russia, a Russian-Ukrain-
ian conflict or a possible future Russian attempt to recapture a position of
dominance in East-Central Europe - might bring nuclear deterrence back to
centre-stage in Europe. The February 1994 Defence White Paper raises the
possibility that in the next 20 years a new threat of major aggression against
Western Europe could emerge 'from a state or coalition of states with large
nuclear and conventional forces'. If such a threat emerged, its military
capabilities would include the 'means for selective or massive nuclear
strikes, high-technology conventional forces, and means of internal subver-
sion'. France must therefore maintain nuclear and C3I capabilities that are
suitable for dealing with 'the possibility of the reappearance of a large threat
comparable to that which the Soviet Union presented'.10
French nuclear forces have also been described as an important element in
the military balance in Europe. The balance seems to remain an East-West
one in French conceptions (that is, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) and friendly countries in East-Central Europe versus Russia and
potential Russian allies among the successor states of the USSR), because of
Russia's enormous military potential. Russian actions in the 'near abroad'
have been widely interpreted in France as evidence of a will in Moscow to
reconstitute a large part of the Soviet empire. Aside from Russia's uncertain
prospects for démocratisation, it is widely agreed that French forces help to
prevent Western Europe from falling under Russia's political-military
shadow and contribute to the maintenance of balanced relations with Mos-
cow. French expert observers continue to express concern about the immense
quantities of nuclear weapons and fissile materials in the former Soviet
Union and uncertainty about the adequacy of US and other Western means of
verifying that the Russians are honouring their promises with regard to
tactical as well as strategic weapons.
Although some French officials and experts have underscored the advan-
tages of doctrinal discretion (for example, retaining flexibility and reducing
the risk of becoming the prisoner of phrases subject to political obsoles-
cence), a vigorous debate is underway about employment doctrine. The long-
standing doctrine - 'pre-strategic' or 'final warning' (ultime avertissement)
nuclear strikes against military targets prior to major strategic retaliation -
seems to remain valid in relation to the potential emergence of a new Russian
threat. The possible use of nuclear weapons in deterrence or combat opera-
tions outside Europe has, however, become a controversial issue.
In February 1991, Mitterrand ruled out any use of nuclear weapons in
response to an Iraqi use of chemical weapons as a 'retreat towards barba-
rism' that would, moreover, be unnecessary given the coalition's conven-
tional superiority. Foreign Minister Roland Dumas added that 'nuclear
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weapons cannot be battlefield weapons, and cannot be used except as the
ultimate recourse when the national territory is threatened'.11 In mid-1992,
however, Defence Minister Pierre Joxe raised the possibility of a 'resurgence
of the former threat, against which our deterrent is well organised' and
contrasted it with the potential emergence of 'a new threat for which we
would be much less prepared'. In view of these uncertainties and the need for
adaptability, Joxe added, it will be necessary 'to correct programmes which
were started in the context of a single threat from the Eas t . . . In addition to
having arms capable of massive distant strikes against predetermined tar-
gets, we should perhaps develop more flexible weapons systems that pro-
mote deterrence more through the precision with which they strike than
through the threat of a general nuclear exchange' .12
Additional official statements of this sort in 1992 were remarkable be-
cause previous attempts to develop more flexible employment options and a
corresponding doctrine (for instance, during the 1986-88 cohabitation) were
promptly rejected. It was argued that planning for such options would
undermine deterrence and the domestic political legitimacy of the nuclear
forces by implying that the principles of 'no war' (non-guerre) and 'no
battle' (non-bataille) could be overturned by aggression. The long-standing
French doctrine has been that nuclear forces are 'weapons of non-use'
(armes de non-emploi), and this has been upheld consistently.
Some prominent officials, civil and military, have recently advocated
more flexible and limited nuclear employment options. For example, in early
1993, shortly before his appointment as the head of the Defence Ministry's
Délégation Générale pour l'Armement, Henri Conze wrote that the concept
of 'anti-cities' strikes must be changed in the pursuit of greater selectivity
and discrimination, partly because it is increasingly unacceptable to public
opinion.13 In August 1993, Colonel Henry de Roquefeuil of the Forces
Aériennes Stratégiques argued that France should complement its traditional
capabilities and doctrine for deterring Soviet coercion or aggression (la
dissuasion du faible au fort) with an approach calculated to deter mischief
by a regional power armed with a few nuclear devices - la dissuasion du fort
au faible (deterrence by the strong of the weak). 'By this logic, the head of
state could choose to demonstrate his determination with a final warning
strike by a small number of Mirage 2000Ns. For such a mission, a missile
with a warhead of some kilotons would be sufficient and easier to use; even a
limited strike would render credible the multi-megaton threat of our strategic
forces. On the other hand, this would mean abandoning the concept of
weapons of non-use [armes de non-emploi]'.H
Similarly, in November 1993, Jacques Baumel, a Gaullist Vice-Chairman
of the National Assembly's Committee on National Defence and the Armed
Forces, called for a 'dual deterrent', consisting of SSBNs capable of anti-
cities strikes and highly accurate long-range missiles that could be launched
from aircraft or surface ships. The latter would enable France to adopt a
doctrine based on 'more selective capabilities, directed against specific
military forces or sensitive installations'. Accuracy, lower yields, confined
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effects, earth-penetrating capabilities and other measures to limit collateral
damage could enable France to threaten 'surgical strikes against potential
adversaries' that might not respect 'the established rules of rationality'.15
Baumel's reference to the uncertain rationality of prospective adversaries
suggests, perhaps unfairly, a link to the widely-repeated phrase la dissua-
sion du fort au fou (deterrence by the strong of the insane). As some French
observers have pointed out, the phrase is strategic nonsense, because the
irrational are by definition incapable of making a sound assessment of risks.
The formulation has nothing to recommend it except alliteration in French. It
inhibits analysis of the real issues in dealing with regional powers that may
try to use a few nuclear weapons to block outside interference with their
plans for aggression and/or the acquisition of additional military assets,
including more weapons of mass destruction, and to protect gains made
through conquest - what some French analysts have called sanctuarisation
aggressive. The French have not yet succeeded, any more than the United
States and other Western countries, in defining more than preliminary guide-
lines for strategies to deter such behaviour and for taking action, if neces-
sary. For some, the true underlying issue in the phrase la dissuasion du fort
au fou is not deterring 'insane' adversaries armed with weapons of mass
destruction, but pre-emptively destroying their capabilities (or neutralising
them in other ways) if deterrent threats seem likely to fail or have virtually
failed. In such circumstances, French analysts have argued, conventional
means (and preferably those of a coalition including the United States)
would obviously be favoured for actual operations.16
Support for a 'more operational' approach to nuclear deterrence and
employment policies appears to have declined since late 1993, when govern-
ment officials began to rule it out emphatically. In November 1993, for
example, Defence Minister François Léotard said that France would retain
its 'doctrine of non-use' despite advocates for change. As Léotard put it,
seeking low-yield weapons for limited strikes could lead to 'a sort of
banalisation of nuclear weapons', which would be 'a profound error' ; and it
would be wiser and entirely feasible to obtain non-nuclear weapons capable
of long-range precision attacks for the requirements in question.17 In a
comparable statement in May 1994, Mitterrand condemned proposals for
'surgical' or 'decapitating' strike capabilities as 'a major heresy' and incon-
sistent with the traditional doctrine that nuclear weapons are for the protec-
tion of France's vital interests and not for use in limited conflicts. As before,
Mitterrand insisted that conventional weapons 'could suffice' to deal with
such challenges. In September 1994, Prime Minister Balladur called atten-
tion to 'the variety of situations' in which nuclear deterrence might play a
role, not excluding 'a crisis far from our soil', but emphasised that 'we
refuse to envisage any drift towards what is called an "employment strat-
egy" for nuclear weapons or towards the notion of nuclear weapons for
battle'.18
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Arms Control
In June 1991, the French government announced that it would sign the NPT,
and the adherence process was completed in August 1992. This represented a
notable change in France's diplomatic and political approach, but not in
France's action policy. In September 1991, the Foreign Minister announced
that France would begin applying the principle of comprehensive or 'full
scope' (contrôle intégral) safeguards to the future export of equipment,
technology and materials linked to nuclear energy. This constituted a sub-
stantial change in action policy. Moreover, in contrast with France's previ-
ous reservations about being closely associated with the NPT, it was an-
nounced in August 1992 that 'France firmly intends to work, in cooperation
with its partners, for the universality of the treaty and for its extension in
1995 for an indefinite duration, and to achieve the greatest possible interna-
tional consensus regarding nuclear non-proliferation'.19
The NPT Extension Conference in April-May 1995 is not in itself a
subject of controversy in France. Virtually everyone supports the Treaty's
indefinite extension, although most are aware of the continuing uncertainties
about the effectiveness of the NPT/IAEA regime. The controversy concerns
the political linkage that has emerged between the NPT Extension Confer-
ence and the negotiations for a CTBT and, more broadly, the future of
French nuclear test programmes.
In April 1992, Prime Minister Pierre Bérégovoy announced President
Mitterrand's decision to suspend nuclear tests, at least until the end of 1992.
The purpose of the moratorium, Bérégovoy said, was to help stop 'over-
armament [surarmement] and above all the accumulation without end of
atomic weapons'.20 This moratorium was extended in 1993, in light of US
and Russian decisions to abstain from testing. In response to US President
Bill Clinton's July 1993 decision to extend the US moratorium on nuclear
testing until September 1994 and to seek a CTBT, the Elysée Palace an-
nounced that France favours a CTBT on condition that it be 'universal and
verifiable'.21
The Chinese nuclear test on 5 October 1993 led the Elysée Palace and
Prime Minister Balladur's office to issue a joint communiqué confirming
both France's technical readiness to resume testing, if necessary, and its
interest in arms control and in simulation capabilities that might substitute
for nuclear tests and thereby assure the continued credibility of France's
deterrent force. President Mitterrand said that 'France will not give the
signal' for a resumption of nuclear tests, but that 'of course, if countries
other than China took the initiative, France would be constrained to assure
what is called the "threshold of sufficiency" for its defence, to pursue its own
tests' .22 Mitterrand has repeatedly made it clear that, in the absence of US or
Russian testing, France will not resume testing while he is President.23 He
has, furthermore, predicted that his successor will follow the same policy,
and has ordered France's nuclear weapons establishment to develop simula-
tion capabilities without any further tests.24
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The probable French conditions for accepting a CTBT have become
apparent since the formal negotiations opened in January 1994:
• A test ban would, the French argue, only make sense in the context of a
stable non-proliferation regime, with the NPT' s indefinite and uncondi-
tional extension in 1995. Reversing the linkage that some have made
between the CTBT and the NPT (that is, seeing commitments by the
recognised nuclear-weapon states to a CTBT as a condition for NPT
extension), Prime Minister Balladur in May 1994 said that 'the decision
made about the NPT in May 1995 will have an effect on the conduct of
the CTBT negotiation . . . a failure to extend the NPT could place into
question our commitment in favour of a treaty banning tests'.23
• Unless the NPT/IAEA regime is effectively enforced in North Korea,
Iraq and elsewhere, extending the NPT and concluding a CTBT would
accomplish little.
• The Conference on Disarmament must be enlarged to make it 'repre-
sentative and legitimate'. This enlargement must encompass all the
'threshold' states - those suspected of having an inclination and capa-
bility to develop nuclear weapons - and all must become parties to the
CTBT.26 This will probably - at a minimum - be France's interpretation
of 'universal' adherence prior to the Treaty's entry into force.
• The CTBT must be enforced with an effective verification regime (to be
defined as negotiations proceed).
• There must be an acceptable definition of 'permitted' or 'Treaty-
compliant' activities, including reasonable ceilings for energy yields in
weapons-related experiments. Indeed, some French experts maintain
that the CTBT regime should allow for a 'confidence test' every five
years to ensure the credibility and safety of the nuclear weapons main-
tained for deterrence, and that even this would entail significant techni-
cal risks. Moreover, some French observers have suggested that a CTBT
might prudently be limited to a duration of ten years, at which point its
merits and drawbacks could be assessed at a review conference.
Some observers have hypothesised that a further condition might be
technical assistance from the United States for simulations - data and
equipment (such as high-powered lasers and computers) - and, preferably,
closer technical cooperation with the United States and the United
Kingdom regarding simulations and other nuclear matters. It should be
noted, however, that a substantial part of the French political-military and
technical elite appears to fear that such cooperation could lead to France
being 'Britainised' (britannisé) - that is, drawn into a condition of
technical dependence on the United States. Although France could benefit
from US assistance in simulations, it is argued, France needs to validate its
own methods and calculations through at least a limited number of its own
experiments over a short period of time, as a hedge against potential difficul-
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ties in the implementation of any US-French agreement. Moreover, the
CTBT verification challenge has also been seen by some as a source of
concern, given the risk that France's own national technical means might be
insufficient and that France might become partially dependent on US verifi-
cation capabilities and, hence, on US choices about what information to
make known to France and others.27
The test moratorium and the growing political pressures for a CTBT,
especially from the United States, have led some French observers in techni-
cal and political-military circles to develop theories about US motives. The
official US line that a CTBT will help to prevent proliferation is widely
discounted because it is known that first-generation nuclear weapons can be
built without any tests. Alternative French theories about why the United
States is pushing for a CTBT have therefore been advanced. Some of the
French hypothesise that the real US goal must be to capitalise on US
conventional force superiority and to inhibit efforts by other countries to
develop more advanced nuclear weapons. In other words, such theories
speculate that the United States may be exploiting the non-proliferation
theme to consolidate its position as the strongest power in the world; a CTBT
would hamper France, China, Russia and others in developing more sophisti-
cated nuclear arsenals and thus inhibit the emergence of rival power centres.
This approach would have the added benefit, some argue, of making France
and other US allies more dependent on US security guarantees and technol-
ogy. Some also argue that the United States may intend to conduct secret,
undetectable low-yield tests. They note that the US Department of Energy
recently acknowledged having conducted 252 secret tests.28
It is, at any rate, a commonplace in French discussions that US motives
are hardly disinterested and that a CTBT would constrain French options far
more than those of the United States. Many of the French contend that,
owing to the lessons learned during the 1958-61 moratorium and the policies
implemented after that experience, the United States is ahead of France and,
indeed, all other countries in preparations for maintaining its nuclear forces
under a no-test regime - either another prolonged moratorium or a formal
treaty ban. Despite the enthusiasm of Mitterrand and some other Socialist
politicians and security affairs analysts, the predominant view in the RPR-
UDF majority and in the military-technical community is one of reluctance
about being rushed into a CTBT. Many resent the impression that some
Americans have conveyed of hastening to conclude a CTBT before
Mitterrand leaves office in May 1995. Some French observers have ex-
pressed confidence that France will find enough like-minded participants in
the Geneva deliberations to prevent the imposition of undesirable deadlines.
As concluding a CTBT before the NPT Extension Conference in April-May
1995 has come to seem less feasible, the inclination on the part of some US
officials to pressure France on this topic has declined and it has become less
significant as a source of US-French discord.29
Personal attacks and innuendos have marked the arguments over the
CTBT and a possible resumption of French testing. Mitterrand has been
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accused of initiating the moratorium in April 1992 for reasons of domestic
politics (to heighten the appeal of the Socialists for the ecologists) and of
continuing it in the hope of winning the next Nobel Peace Prize.30 Gaullists
such as Michel Debré have argued that Mitterrand is undermining France's
national independence and accepting subordination to the United States.31
Mitterrand has implied, in predicting that his successor will not resume
nuclear tests, that any further testing would be comparable to starting a
nuclear war: 'France will not wish to offend the entire world by resuming
nuclear over-armament, by hurting all the countries without nuclear weap-
ons, by holding up to ridicule the countries of the Third World and all the
poor countries . . . France will not, moreover, wish to be the country that
resumes atomic warfare'.32
RPR and UDF politicians and members of the military-technical elite
resent critical formulations that imply that they are not interested in deter-
rence and war-prevention, but in using nuclear weapons. This accusation has
been made repeatedly by Pascal Boniface and others who favour a 'less
operational' nuclear deterrent posture. In Boniface's view, one of the advan-
tages of halting tests would be preventing the development of more 'usable'
nuclear weapons.33
The mainstream view of the RPR-UDF majority was summed up in a
December 1993 National Assembly committee report. The report concluded
that it is 'indisputable' that France must conduct approximately 20 more
tests: about 10 tests for two modernisation programmes (a variable-yield
warhead for a longer-range air-launched missile and the new TN 100
warhead for the M5 SLBM) and about ten tests to calibrate simulation
capabilities. Most of the tests for the latter purpose could be postponed until
after 1995, the report indicated, given current constraints - for instance, the
time it will take to procure new computers, radiographie equipment and
lasers for simulations. The report also noted that the PALEN (Préparation à
la Limitation des Essais Nucléaires) programme for simulations at the
Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique was originally conceived in 1991 as a
means of coping with further limits on testing, owing in part to budgetary
constraints, and not as a means of foregoing tests entirely.34
French investments in research on simulation capabilities have been sub-
stantially increased since 1992, but some French technical experts have
expressed doubts as to whether 10, 20 or 50 tests or more would be enough
to devise simulation means capable of eliminating any need for testing,
especially during a test ban lasting longer than a decade. Despite the ru-
mours that the December 1993 report called for only around 20 more tests
because the capacity of the test site to absorb more tests is doubtful,
authoritative sources indicate that it remains technically feasible to conduct
far more than 20 tests at Mururoa and Fangataufa in the South Pacific. The
capacity of the test site is in part a function of the blast yield of the devices
exploded; a large number of low-yield tests could therefore be conducted.35
Defence Minister Leotard has told members of the National Assembly that
France could develop simulation capabilities comparable to those of the
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United States in nine or ten years, that this will require further tests, and that
Paris will not adhere to a CTBT until France has mastered such simulation
capabilities.36 Prime Minister Balladur has noted, moreover, that France has
never agreed to link its test moratorium to the CTBT negotiations: 'A
possible resumption of tests as a function of the international situation and
the behaviour of the other nuclear powers and our participation in the
negotiations are therefore not at all incompatible'.37Some French observers
have nonetheless expressed concern that potent political factors may over-
whelm the reservations and conditions that the government has articulated
about accepting an extension of the test moratorium and a CTBT.
Cooperation with Allies
Several French officials have suggested since 1989 that a mechanism should
be found (perhaps a European nuclear consultation arrangement) that would
affirm the strategic solidarity of the United Kingdom, France and Germany.
For example, in July 1990, when he was the Defence Minister, Jean-Pierre
Chevènement suggested that a Western European defence partnership offer-
ing nuclear protection to Germany was the only option, given the alterna-
tives. 'An American protection that risks seeming more and more uncertain?
Or Germany's choice to assure her security by herself?'38 In January 1992,
Mitterrand raised the possibility of devising a 'European doctrine' within the
European Community for the French and British nuclear forces.39
Although several similar statements were made in 1992 and an Anglo-
French Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine was established in
1992-93, French interest in establishing a Western European nuclear con-
sultation arrangement has been tempered by events. It is still often argued
that France's deterrent posture helps to stabilise the overall security situa-
tion in Europe by imposing caution and restraint on potential adversaries.
Furthermore, the February 1994 Defence White Paper declared that 'the
problem of a European nuclear doctrine is bound to become one of the maj or
questions in the construction of a common European defence. The pertinence
of the issue will become more evident as the European Union builds its
political identity as well as its security and defence identity. Such a prospect
remains distant, but must not be lost from sight. With nuclear capabilities, in
fact, Europe's defence autonomy is possible. Without them, it is out of the
question'. On the other hand, the Defence White Paper continued, 'there
will, however, be no European nuclear doctrine or European deterrent until
there are European vital interests, considered as such by the Europeans and
so understood by others. In the meantime, France does not intend to dilute its
means of national defence in such a domain under any pretext'.40
The interest that Mitterrand expressed in a European nuclear doctrine at
the beginning of 1992 has evidently cooled as well. In May 1994, Mitterrand
raised the question of whether French nuclear capabilities would someday be
able 'to guarantee the integrity and security' of the countries of the European
Union, and placed his answer in a rather long-term perspective. Satisfying
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the necessary conditions, including unity of political and strategic command
and clear agreement on shared vital interests, would require 'immense efforts
and progress', he said. Indeed, he estimated that building such a united
Europe would require 'a century and perhaps two centuries'. In the same
speech, Mitterrand emphasised that nuclear decision-making cannot be
shared and that the primary purpose of France's nuclear forces is protecting
'the integrity of the national territory', even though 'other vital interests'
may require a broader definition of purpose.41
Cooperation with Western European allies about nuclear-weapons mat-
ters has been a secondary topic of contention in comparison with the major
arguments about force posture, doctrine and testing. Indeed, this issue has
often served as a source of debating points in the main arguments. Some
supporters of what is here termed a 'more operational' posture have champi-
oned Western European and NATO projects to build active defences against
missiles and aircraft, as well as Western European cooperation regarding
nuclear forces and a possible multilateral nuclear consultation forum. It has
been suggested that non-nuclear Western European countries could be 'pro-
tected by a European nuclear umbrella or by a French one at the service of
Europe' and could participate by accepting deployments of French aircraft
equipped with new nuclear-armed air-launched missiles. 'This would bring
our delivery vehicles closer to their potential targets'.42
In contrast, champions of a more traditional and 'less operational'
nuclear-weapons posture note that France's non-nuclear allies in Western
Europe, such as Germany, Spain and Italy, have expressed no interest in
such deployments, and formal French proposals to this effect might well be
divisive and subject to misinterpretation.43 From this perspective, the goal of
Western European cooperation in nuclear weapons matters can only be
successfully pursued if France adheres to its traditional approach to nuclear
deterrence and hypothetical force employment and rejects proposals to
build more flexible, discriminate and usable nuclear forces. According to
Boniface, 'there is a fundamental contradiction between the perspective of
a Europeanisation of the French nuclear forces and the risk of sliding
towards a nuclear policy that would no longer be solely deterrent. Our
European partners will not follow us towards concepts of employment of
nuclear weapons that we ourselves always rejected in the past'.44
Cooperation regarding nuclear weapons under Atlantic Alliance auspices
has remained a rather sensitive issue in France, owing in part to the
tenacious myth, still robust after it first emerged in the mid-1960s, that
participation in NATO's integrated military structure or Nuclear Planning
Group would represent subordination to the United States. Despite the
reservations that France expressed about certain nuclear issues when it
approved NATO's November 1991 Strategic Concept, the remaining doctri-
nal differences between France and its NATO allies regarding nuclear-
weapons matters appear to be relatively minor.
Indeed, in implementing the decision at the January 1994 NATO summit
'to intensify and expand' the Alliance's efforts against the proliferation of
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weapons of mass destruction, the Alliance has established a Defence Group
on Proliferation that is co-chaired by the United States (represented by
Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter) and France (represented by
the Director of the French Defence Ministry's Délégation aux Affaires
Stratégiques, Jean-Claude Mallet). While the European co-chair of this body
will rotate to other countries, it is significant that France agreed to be the
first to serve in this role. Moreover, bilateral cooperation between France
and the United States in some nuclear weapons-relevant areas has improved.
In 1993, for example, the US Air Combat Command and the Forces
Aériennes Stratégiques for the first time conducted joint exercises, which
included mutual refuelling of B-lBs and Mirage IVPs in Kansas and
France.45
Intra-Alliance Differences
The most contentious issues in recent years have not involved NATO as
much as disagreements between major allies about basic strategic policy
concepts. An absence of transatlantic consensus has been apparent, for
example, in French interpretations of the implications of some recent and
current US policies on nuclear weapons. During the Bush administration,
high-level French officials repeatedly deplored signs of US interest in 'con-
ventional deterrence', a senseless and imprudent phrase in the eyes of many
French observers.46 The February 1994 Defence White Paper defined the
concept and explained that it is:
based on the idea that certain sophisticated conventional technologies
can confer radical superiority and allow for extreme reductions or even
an elimination of the role of nuclear forces in defence. It is illusory and
dangerous to claim that such technologies could have the effect of
preventing war as nuclear weapons do. All the lessons of history argue
against it. These conceptions emphasise conventional force balances,
which are by nature unstable and based on operational strategies, for
preparing and conducting war. They suggest the possibility of resolving
international problems through the use of force and imply an arms race.
They are not compatible with our strategy. Far from substituting for
nuclear deterrence, a so-called conventional deterrent could only com-
plement i t . . . Moreover, nuclear weapons remain the means to compen-
sate, if necessary, for possible insufficiencies in other areas, and allow
for an avoidance of a 'conventional arms race' that would be contrary to
our defence policy and unacceptable from a financial viewpoint.47
Since the beginning of the Clinton administration, French officials have
taken note of publications by Les Aspin, William Perry, Ashton Carter and
others and have discerned signs of a US interest in delegitimising and
marginalising nuclear weapons and in taking steps to reduce their impor-
tance in international politics.48 Such approaches are substantially at vari-
ance with those favoured by many in the French political class and military-
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technical community. Most of the French reject any questioning of the
legitimacy of nuclear deterrence. The French are probably more sensitive
regarding this issue than a number of other nations. As some French observ-
ers have pointed out, nuclear weapons are more important to France, and not
only psychologically and symbolically, than they are to the United States and
some other countries, which have differing geopolitical interests and security
assets and instruments. These observers attribute the current interest of some
US officials and experts in marginalising nuclear deterrence to the privileged
geographical position of the United States and its conventional force advan-
tages, which could be reinforced if Washington could use non-proliferation
themes to impose a CTBT and hinder the nuclear-weapons programmes of
other powers.
France has made relatively large investments in nuclear forces since the
late 1950s, and for many in France certain ideas and convictions have
become closely interwoven. Nuclear weapons have become associated with
national independence and security against another world war and, more
broadly, with General Charles de Gaulle's successful efforts to restore
France's honour and international status. Nuclear weapons are deemed an
insurance policy in an uncertain and unstable world and a guarantee of
France's political and strategic autonomy. Despite intermittent and appar-
ently growing concerns about nuclear-reactor safety and nuclear waste-
disposal problems, and aside from some of the minor political parties, the
consensus behind nuclear deterrence in France remains remarkably robust -
particularly in a comparative perspective. According to some French observ-
ers, France's support for nuclear deterrence is 'irreversible' in the foresee-
able future; and France's resistance to the 'denuclearisation' logic is so
profound that, if that logic won widespread support, France would be the
last to abandon nuclear deterrence.49
One of the recent French concerns about US policy has been that the
United States might announce a no-first-use pledge in the hope that such a
pledge (and perhaps an international convention to that effect) would lessen
the role of nuclear weapons in international politics and promote non-
proliferation goals. French observers maintain that such a policy could have
damaging effects on the cohesion of US alliances and on the credibility of
US extended deterrence commitments and associated non-proliferation ar-
rangements, but nonetheless might be portrayed in short-sighted analyses as
advantageous for the United States in view of US conventional force superi-
ority. Many French observers hold that such analyses are not conceivable
for France (or for the United Kingdom, for that matter), in view of Russia's
substantial non-nuclear capabilities and the limitations of France's non-
nuclear forces. For France and the other urbanised and vulnerable nations of
Western Europe, it is argued, a major conventional war in Europe is unac-
ceptable and must be resolutely and decisively ruled out through a robust
strategy of nuclear deterrence; a no-first-use policy would imply that nuclear
weapons employment could not be threatened or carried out unless an enemy
used such weapons first.
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Although a few French proponents of a no-first-use pledge can be identi-
fied,50 most of the French strategic community - including those in the 'less
operational' school of thought - reject it. In their view, it would undermine
nuclear deterrence and imply doubts about its coherence and legitimacy.
Pascal Boniface has dismissed no-first-use pledges as 'unverifiable and
incompatible with the very concept of deterrence'.51 An American no-first-
use initiative would therefore probably encounter strong French resistance.
If the United States decided to join China in championing a no-first-use
pledge, some French observers have suggested, France could probably count
on the United Kingdom and perhaps Russia to oppose the conclusion of a
general convention. They note that Russia effectively abandoned the Soviet
Union's 1982 no-first-use pledge in November 1993.52
Rather than favouring a no-first-use pledge, French experts are debating
whether and how France should reformulate its negative security assur-
ances. (Negative security assurances have historically consisted of
commitments by nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against states
legally committed to non-nuclear status and not allied with nuclear
powers.) In August 1992, the French government said that it would
intensify its efforts to make existing declaratory negative security
assurances 'a juridically constraining guarantee against the use or threat of
nuclear weapons by states equipped with these weapons'.53
In the interim, officials and experts have raised questions about future
French nuclear policy: what should France do about states armed with
chemical and biological weapons, given that France has renounced these
weapons? Should France reformulate its commitment to indicate that it will
not threaten nuclear weapons employment against states without weapons
of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical or biological? Or should France
simply declare that it will not use nuclear weapons as long as its vital
interests are not threatened? Some French analysts cite the new Defence
White Paper in this regard. 'Our deterrent posture must be maintained for
the protection of our vital interests, whatever the origin and form of the
threat'.54
France's main partner in the European Union, Germany, has also been a
source of some concern for French officials responsible for nuclear security
matters. Once again, intra-alliance consensus about basic policy guidelines
has been less than total. In December 1993, German Foreign Minister Klaus
Kinkel proposed that the United Nations establish a register of nuclear
weapons in the interests of transparency and international confidence and
as a complement to the register of conventional arms transfers.55 It seems
that one of the German motives was to promote an equalisation of treatment
of the nuclear-weapon powers and non-nuclear-weapon states, with the
argument that the latter have already accepted full transparency in the form
of IAEA safeguards. A nuclear weapons register might, it was argued, serve
as a 'sweetener' to help to gain an extension of the NPT by showing that the
nuclear-weapon powers are sincere about fulfilling their obligations under
Article VI of the NPT. Furthermore, the register could be seen as a security
Nuclear Debates in France • 131
precaution in case another nuclear-weapon state (in addition to the USSR)
disintegrates, and it could complement the proposed cut-off of the
production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.56
In the event, even the second version of the German proposal - a register
of dismantled nuclear weapons - was unacceptable to the United Kingdom,
France and the United States; and the German government abandoned it in
April 1994. It is noteworthy that Paris rejected this German concept
perhaps even more firmly than London and Washington. It appears that the
French argued that such a register could lead to demands for details about
the location and types of weapons and, furthermore, that the very concept
implied une logique de culpabilisation - as if the nuclear-weapon powers
were somehow guilty parties that should be under surveillance. The French
contended that making the recognised nuclear-weapon states more vulner-
able to international political pressure would not deter aggression or
prevent proliferation by threshold countries. Some French observers
hypothesised that the Germans may have had motives in addition to those
that were articulated - for instance, appealing to anti-nuclear sentiments for
domestic political reasons, engaging in a 'demagogic stunt' vis-à-vis the
Third World, and settling scores with Paris because of jealousy regarding
France's status as a nuclear-weapon power.57
The context of French reactions to perceived policy trends and attitudes
in major allies, such as Germany and the United States, has probably been
as important as the anti-nuclear policies of non-nuclear-weapon states, such
as Mexico, in the Conference on Disarmament in leading the French to rule
out 'denuclearisation' emphatically. As Prime Minister Balladur said in
May 1994, a CTBT 'must not in any way envisage the elimination of
nuclear weapons or seek to undermine the status of the nuclear powers. Any
move in this direction would encounter France's opposition'.58
Prospects
As the recent interactions with Germany and the United States suggest,
France is in a new and not entirely welcome situation of greater
vulnerability to the decisions of others. The international political context
has changed radically from that of the Cold War, during which France built
its nuclear-weapons posture and formulated its strategic policy guidelines.
Partly because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was not
seen during the Cold War as an imminent peril (although the trends were
underway for those who cared to notice them), it was possible for France to
be contented with a 'mini-superpower' force posture and a doctrine of
strategic autonomy (la dissuasion du faible au fort) with a very low risk of
this posture and doctrine ever being tested. France's independent deterrent
was in fact a fall-back posture complementary to the arrangements under-
taken by the United States and the other NATO allies. During the Cold War,
with NATO responsible for Western security, France could assert its nu-
clear-based independence from the superpowers and champion the constitu-
tion of a Western European defence entity, with little likelihood that its
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neighbours in Western Europe would ever accept it on French terms and
little risk that they would ever propose arrangements that would put France's
autonomy into question. The Cold War had frozen the international political
situation, especially in Europe, and had perpetuated and protected a context
in which France's nuclear-weapons posture and corresponding aspirations
for autonomy could flourish.
The end of the Cold War and the changes symbolised by the Gulf War -
the actual and prospective rise of regional powers equipped with weapons
of mass destruction - have brought a number of changes that imply
politically and psychologically wrenching challenges for the old policies.
The new non-proliferation agenda requires France to work more closely
with other governments to develop a consensus on international norms that
must be respected. It implies a greater necessity for cooperation and
conformity in a number of larger and, in some ways, less congenial groups
than the Atlantic Alliance. In other words, it implies giving up, to some
extent, France's long-standing aspirations to autonomy, leadership and
great-power status in order to accept a more modest role or, at least, a less
singular one. The pragmatic necessity for more closely coordinated policies
in NATO and in larger forums is often perceived and presented in France as
an abridgement of sovereignty and freedom of action, rather than as a
positive opportunity.
The fundamental changes in the strategic situation are suggested by the
growing French interest in active defences against aircraft, cruise missiles
and ballistic missiles. An increasing number of French analysts have argued
that, in addition to the inherent military value of being able to defend
against some types of attacks, such defences are necessary to forestall the
danger of internal political déstabilisation if the government had no means
to counter delivery vehicles that could be armed with nuclear, chemical or
biological payloads. The Patriot experience in the Gulf War, French
observers contend, showed that even an imperfect and inadequate defence
can be of great political value - a means of resistance that can provide
psychological reassurance to the public. The government's freedom of
action in dealing with a future crisis could depend on the public being
convinced that the government can defend the nation.59
The February 1994 Defence White Paper called attention to the potential
value of enhanced air and missile defences and improved detection
capabilities, notably space-based means, and emphasised the pursuit of
extended air defences,60 perhaps owing in part to the cost and technical
difficulty of ballistic-missile defence. Some French observers discern great
merits in space-based and other technical surveillance and intelligence means
that could enable France to minimise dependence on the United States.
France has, however, long been frustrated with the limits of its own national
resources and the difficulties of enlisting countries in addition to Spain; and
Italy in military space projects, including satellite reconnaissance. While
some in France continue to see advantages in an exclusively European
framework for air and missile defence, Defence Minister Leotard has argued
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that this effort 'can only be Western. I do not even say European, because it
presupposes a satellite network, a network of radars and types of weapons
that are beyond the reach of individual states . . . It is necessary to work on
it, but we will not be able to do it alone'.61
In other words, active defence requirements may over time encourage
France to deepen its cooperation with European partners and the United
States and to accept a role as simply one element in a large and necessarily
integrated mechanism that will require rapid, perhaps even virtually auto-
matic, responsiveness, at least against some types of threats. These require-
ments are given urgency mainly by the proliferation of missiles and weapons
of mass destruction. Paradoxically, however, some French observers con-
tend that the arguments about how to deal with nuclear proliferation have
encouraged a focus on the vital interests of the nation, and that this has
underscored the magnitude of the challenge in devising a multilateral West-
ern European defence structure involving nuclear consultations and commit-
ments. Moreover, in contrast with the mainstream support for enhanced
cooperation and mutual confidence in the European Union, some in France
have highlighted the importance of nuclear-weapons capabilities as an asset
that may brake the decline in France's relative importance as that of Ger-
many rises.
Ballistic-missile defence has also become an unsettling issue for some in
France because of the Clinton administration's interest in seeking a clarifica-
tion of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that would facilitate
the development of effective theatre missile defences (TMD). French observ-
ers argue that the proposed US-Russian understanding (which would report-
edly permit TMD systems as long as they did not have a tested capability
against re-entry vehicles arriving at a speed greater than 5 kilometres per
second, the speed of a ballistic missile with a range of approximately
3,000km) would not in itself undermine the effectiveness of the French
deterrent, because M-4, M-45 and M-5 SLBMs could penetrate such de-
fences. Some of the French express concern, however, that licensing such
defences could 'destabilise' the strategic context and eventually lead to an
'arms race' and the development of defences that could erode the credibility
of France's strategic ballistic missiles. Moreover, some French observers
contend, loosening the traditionally observed interpretations of the ABM
Treaty would be inconsistent with the US administration's arms-control
aims of seeking an unlimited extension of the NPT and the conclusion of a
CTBT, and might also hinder the pursuit of further US and Russian strategic
nuclear arms reductions (if these TMD systems were deployed in Russia
and/or the United States).62
Nuclear testing, more than any other question, brings to a head the most
contentious issues. Many in France who support a resumption of testing fear
that Mitterrand may be correct in his judgement that the next President will
be politically incapable of resuming tests. The word that comes up in every
conversation is that France may be coincée - cornered or boxed in - by the
international context of the NPT Extension Conference, the CTBT negotia-
tions, the US pressure not to test, the unsympathetic attitudes in Germany
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and in other non-nuclear-weapon states in the European Union, and the anti-
nuclear sentiments in the South Pacific. Such considerations argue against
testing, but the predominant conviction in the political class and military-
technical elite is that complete confidence in simulations without any further
testing is unlikely in the foreseeable future.63
François de Rose, one of France's most distinguished experts in strategic
affairs, has argued that France will have to choose between 'the erosion of
the value of our nuclear forces and the risk of a grave diplomatic crisis. The
lesser evil . . . would be the diplomatic crisis: not only on grounds of
security, but also to avoid sliding towards a de facto denuclearisation of the
West of the Old Continent while, in the East, Russia would remain a major
nuclear power'. Like a number of other French observers, de Rose contends
that France should undertake a limited test series in order to enhance its
simulation capabilities, after which it would cease testing for the indefinite
future. In his view, the simulations rationale for a limited test series should
be made clear in advance to limit the scale and intensity of objections in
France and abroad.64
A consensus that France may have to find ways to pursue its objectives
without nuclear tests seems to be emerging, if only because a resumption of
testing will be increasingly difficult on political grounds with the passage of
time - even though support for weapons with new designs, including low
yields and special effects, persists in some technical and political circles. It
is generally conceded that Mitterrand's successor will feel bound, to some
extent, by the decisions taken since France's test moratorium began in April
1992.
It is uncertain whether the next President will resume nuclear testing.
Such a decision would not be popular outside France. The President would
have to be in a strong domestic political position, backed by a national
consensus in support of testing (which would probably not be available,
according to polls of mass public opinion), or upheld by strength and
determination from other sources.65 De Gaulle's order in 1960 for France's
initial nuclear tests was given, it is recalled, in the face of substantial
domestic and international opposition. The weaker the President's convic-
tions and domestic political base, the less likely it is that he will order a
resumption of testing.
The impact of the international context is not readily predictable. Chinese
behaviour - including continued testing - might help to provide the context
for resuming tests for simulation capabilities. On the other hand, US pres-
sures on France to refrain from even a limited test series for simulation
purposes would probably not achieve the intended effect. US criticisms
could lead to a hardening of the French position - and perhaps even a more
extensive test series - to demonstrate France's independence.
During the Cold War, the practical policy issues now under consideration
were not present with such acuity:
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• Proposals were made for limited and flexible nuclear-employment op-
tions, but they could more readily be dismissed in view of what seemed
to be a stable East-West deterrent balance, and relatively little attention
was given to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
possible nuclear employment contingencies outside Europe.
• Pressures to accept limits on nuclear testing could be resisted or
finessed with self-imposed constraints (all French testing has been
conducted underground since 1974).
• Ballistic-missile defences and improved air defences were also seen in
an East-West context; France argued against any revisions to the ABM
Treaty regime, which proved to be stable; and work on such defences
proceeded quite deliberately because of the apparent stability of the
East-West military stalemate and because missile proliferation outside
Europe was scarcely noticed.
The essence of the new situation, as a number of French observers see it,
is a novel and aggravating sense of dependence on foreign decisions - for
permission to test nuclear warheads; for US assistance with simulations, if
the international context does not allow France to conduct tests; for US
intelligence to help to verify a test ban, if one is concluded; for Western
European and US cooperation to build effective air and missile defences;
for US and Russian restraint to retain the traditional ABM Treaty
limitations; and so forth. It seems clear that future French nuclear-weapons
policies will represent compromises between elements of the 'more opera-
tional' and 'less operational' approaches, with some effort (in accordance
with a long-standing pattern in French defence policy) to keep options open
and to postpone irrevocable choices - despite the budgetary constraints and
other defence priorities that are likely to cut back France's nuclear
ambitions. But what is most striking is the extent to which French choices
are likely to be influenced by those made by other nations. The challenges to
the traditional French approach to nuclear strategy can also be seen as
challenges to French convictions about the nation's autonomy and interna-
tional status.
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